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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
OGDEX CITY, A

FERRELL H.

~lunicipal

Corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.
State Treasurer of Utah,
Defendant.

ADA~IS,

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Comes now the Plaintiff and respectfully shows and
represents to the Honorable Court:
The majority opinion is erroneous in not construing
Section 46-0-219, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, to make
it operative and effective rather than making a. substantial part of it nugatory and its enactment by the
legislature an absurdity.
For the foregoing reason, plaintiff respectfully
petitions this Court to reconsider the case and grant
a rehearing thereof, and upon said rehearing, to grant
the relief prayed for in the complaint filed herein.
Dated this 12th day of July, 1952.
PAUL THATCHER,
CHARLES H. SNEDDON,
JACK A. RICHARDS,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are adequately stated in the plaintiff's
brief heretofore filed. Reference is made to the opinion
filed herein, particularly the second to last paragraph
of the majority opinion, which reads:
''Thus we conclude that the Legislature intended
to remit fines and forfeitures to towns and
cities only when the attorneys of such municipalities conduct on behalf of the State the proceedings against the accused, but the Legislature has
failed to give town and city attorneys that
authorization and hence Sec. 46-0-219, insofar
as it provides for the remission of fines and forfeitures to towns and cities, is ineffectual until
such time as that authorization is conferred."
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. The majority opinion is erroneous in not construing Section 46-0-219, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, to make it operative and effective rather
than making a substantial part of it nugatory
and its enactment by the legislature an absurdity.
ARGUMENT
The Court's opinion makes ineffective Section 460-219, U tab Code Annotated, 1943, except as to that
phrase which requires all fines and forfeitures to he
paid to the state treasurer. In effect, it holds that the
legislature did a useless and meaningless thing in providing that certain fines a-rid forfeitures be remitted to
towns, cities and counties.
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One of the cardinal rnlP~ of ~tatntory construction
is that statutes should be construed, if possible, so that
they are effertiYe rather than nugatory. See numerous
cases digested, ~=a lT tah & Pacific Digest 819, "Statute",
Sections 17-1 and 175. The editor's comments there,
citing many cases, are :
··A statute must be construed, if possible, so as
to give it force and effect.''
''Courts will construe the language of a statute
so as to give effect to, rather than to nullify, it.''
"If language will reasonably permit, statutes will
be construed so as to render them operative.''
In Tr alters rs. BaJ/k of .America Nt. Trust (1937),
9 Cal. (2) 46,52; 69 P. (2) 839, 110 .A.L.R. 1259; Sacramento CouHty rs. Sacramento City, 75 Cal . .App. (2) 436,
171 P. (2) -177, the court holds:
''A statute should never be construed so strictly
as to render it absurd or nugatory.''
This Court in Taft vs. Grande, et al, 114 Utah 435,
201 P. (2) 285, held, as reported in Headnote No. 1:

•'It is court's duty in interpreting a statute to
give effect to legislative intent as expressed by
wording of statute and if reasonably possible,
effect should be given to every part of statute
and if enactment is subject to one or more interpretations by reason of conflicting provisions,
then that construction which will harmonize and
give effect to all provisions is preferred.''
And the Supreme Court of Arizona in Maricopa
County vs. Doughal, 208 P. (2nd) 646, 69 .Ariz. 35, said:
''The court should make every effort to sustain and uphold statutes rather than to defeat
them, and to give them operation and effect if
3
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the language will permit, rather than treat them
as meaningless.'' Utah and Pacific Digest, Statutes Key Number 174 to 190, inclusive.
Another important rule is that the intent of the
legislature is the controlling factor and the Court should
interpret the statute so that the intent of the legislature
is given effect even though technical meanings of words
have to be ignored. As this Court said in Board of
Education vs. Bryner et al, 57 U. 78, 192 P. 627, at Page
82 of the U tab report:
"The doctrine is, however, also recognized that
the same words, especially if found in different
statutes, may not always have the same effect.
It follows that in order to determine the intention
and purpose of the lawmaker, and to harmonize
conflicting provisions where such occur, it at
times becomes necessary for the courts to expand
or to restrict the ordinary and usual meaning of
words, phrases, or clauses found in a particular
section or statute. In that connection, it is also
necessary to observe the cardinal rule of construction that every word and phrase must be
given some force and effect, if possible, and this
notwith~.tanding the fact that in doing so the
effect of the particular section or statute may
thereby be enlarged or restricted, as the case
may be. When, therefore, the language of a
section or statute is ambiguous and doubtful, and
on reading the language there is doubt whether
it should be applied in accordance with its ordinary and usual meaning or whether it should receive an enlarged or restricted construction and
effect, it is the duty of the court to look beyond
the statute if by doing so they can better determine the intention and purpose of the lawmakers ... ''
4
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and in Jloormt>ister cs. Dt>pt of Re9istratioH, 288 P. 900,
76 Utah 146, headnote 3:
· '\Y ord~ of statute are frequently given enlarged,
restricted, or modified meaning to effectuate
legislatiYe intent."

In Trrathall v. Johnsou et al, 86 Ut. 50, 40 P. (2nd)
755, the court said, at Page 103, Utah Report:
· · I\::eeping in mind at least two rules of statutory
construction, first, if possible, every word and
phrase of a sta.tute must be given effect, and no
words shall be rejected if possible to retain them
and giYe them effect and meaning; and, second,
the intent of the legislature must be ascertained
and given effect, which intent and meaning is
to be determined primarily from the language
of the statutes themselves, recognizing that in
so doing it is not proper to consider a word or
phrase disconnected from other parts of the
act and recognizing that words and phrases must
be given their ordinary meaning, uless it is necessary to give to particular words or phrases a
restricted or an enlarged meaning so as to harmonize all the provisions of the statute and make
them effective ... " (Italics added)
And in State v. Franklin et al, 63 Ut. 442, 226 P.
674, at Page 447 of the Utah report, the Court said:

''It is also an elementary rule of statutory construction that the meaning of words found in
the statute must be determined from the general
context of the same and the intent or object sought
to be accomplished by the legislation; that court
in attempting to arrive at the intent of the legislature will disregard mere form and look to the
substance.''
5
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'rhe Court's op1n10n holds that town and city attorneys cannot file cases for violation of the Liquor
Control Act and pursue them independently of county
and district attorneys. The reasons given for such
holding are very strong and compelling. As the opinion
says, a second system of law enforcement would not be
a good thing and would only lead to confusion and overlapping of functions. We must assume that all the
arguments against a second and overlapping system
were known to the legislature at the time Section 46-0219 was enacted and the legislature did not want and
so did not provide for town and city attorneys to act
independently of county and district attorneys in liquor
cases. It is also reasonable to assume that at the time
of the enactment of Section 46-0-219, there was no
reason to suppose that sometime in the future conditions
would change so that another legislature would set up
a dual system for enforcing the Liquor Control Act.
The reasons for not providing for the dual system in
the first place are not mere transitory reasons, but are
compelling and basic. It follows, then, that the Court's
conclusion in the second to last paragraph of its opinion
as to what the legislature intended cannot he correct.
If the legislature intended to remit fines and forfeitures
to cities and towns only when attorneys of such municipalities conducted on behalf of the State proceedings
against the accused, the legislature intended something
that could never be. This is ridiculous. Under the
Court's interpretation of the act, the legislature involved
did not provide for cities and towns to ever receive fines
and forfeitures back, and that legislature had every
reason to know that no subsequent legislature would
set up the dual system of enforcement. Thus, at no
6
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time could cities and towns recover any of the fines
and forfeitures. It is inconceivable that the legislature
would say fines and forfeitures would be returned to
towns and cities on certain conditions, knowing the conditions imposed could never be filled and therefore
tmYns and cities could never receive any of the fines
and forfeitures.
The intention of the legislature in enacting Section 46-0-219, as found by all members of this Court
in this case, was to provide for a return to towns and
cities in some cases of the fines and forfeitures forwarded to the state treasurer. The Court's opinion
says that the cases when remittances are to be made
are only those when the attorneys for the town or city
prosecute and conduct the trials and hearings, and since
the attorneys cannot do that, towns and cities cannot
get any of the fines or forfeitures back. This ruling
defeats the obvious and overarching purpose of returning some of the fines and forfeitures and, as clearly
shown by the cases herein cited, such an interpretation
is to be avoided if there is another reasonable interpretation which will give effect to the legislative purpose.
The Court's opinion which results in holding the
legislature did a useless act and defeats its overarching
purposes results from the restricted meaning given the
words ''prosecute'' and ''conduct'' in Section 46-0-219.
The opinion insists the usual meaning be attributed to
those two words, but in the same paragraph, the Court
interprets the word ''officer'' in the statute to mean not
what is usually meant by that word, but the very special
and unusual meaning of "town or city attorney".

7
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In addition to the reasons given by ~Ir. Justice
Wade in his dissenting opinion, we submit that "officer", "prosecute" and "conduct" cannot all be given
their usual meaning in this statute and have it make
sense. One or more of those words was definitely used
by the legislature not in its usual and ordinary meaning. The Court's opinion chooses to hold that "procecute" and "conduct" were the words the legislature
intended to have their usual meaning and ''officers''
was used by the legislature not to mean "officers", but
to mean "town or city attorney". This decision makes
the statute a nullity and defeats what is the obvious
overall legislative intent to return some fines and forfeitures to the cities and towns. On the other hand,
if the Court would give the word "officer" its usual
meaning and give ''prosecute'' and ''conduct'' the
broader meaning than is usually given, the Court would
give effect to the overall intent of the legislature, as
found by the Court, that some fines and forfeitures be
returned, and would avoid the conclusion that the legislature did a useless act when it enacted the latter portions of Section 46-0-219.
In this case, when in any event one or more words
will have to be given a different meaning than is usually
given, and one interpretation results in a useless and
nugatory statute and the other interpretation results in
an effective and meaningful statute, the Court should
take the interpretation which results in a live statute
rather than the one which results in a useless and dead
statute. To do otherwise clearly would violate the ex-
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pn·~~

n1andate of the legislature that ~tatutory proYisions ••are to be liberally construed with a view to
effect the objects of the statutes ... " (Emphasis added.)
Section 8:2-:2-:2, U .C.A. 19-!3.
The Court's opinion is contrary to and in effect
overrules this statute and the Court's previous decisions in which it has held that if possible, statutes
should be interpreted so that they are effective rather
than nugatory.
It is respectfully urged that a rehearing be granted
in this matter, and that the interpretation of the statute
herein involved be again considered by the Court, and
upon said reconsideration, the plaintiff be granted the
relief prayed for in its complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL THATCHER,
CHHARLES H. SNEDDON,
JACK A. RICHARDS,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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